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The land restitution in Bulgaria led to a severe fragmentation in land ownership. This has an 
impact on the agricultural development and land market. The article investigates the land 
transactions on the sale and rentals markets. In order to explain the processes three new 
institutional economic theories will be employed: property rights theory, transaction costs 
theory and agricultural contract theory. First, the article reviews the appropriateness of each 
theory, and second, results of conducted survey in two regions of Bulgaria with different 
degrees of land fragmentation.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Bulgaria has experienced extreme changes during the last 15 years. Land reform 
returned the land to the people that had owned it before collectivization. The land, however, 
has been highly fragmented in the past and the restitution process deepened this problem 
further. The possibility for exchange of rights between landlords and land users has increased 
after restricted land market was liberalized.  However, this exchange is hindered by passive 
landlords and heirs who have not obtained deeds of ownership.  Therefore, both unwillingness 
of landlords to participate in land market and highly fragmented plots create difficulties for 
land users to contract with landlords.  
The purpose of the study is to understand the economic effects of land fragmentation 
in agricultural development. The main objectives of the paper are: to clarify how the ‘bundles’ 
of rights attributed to the landownership influence the economic outcomes; to analyze land 
transactions for exchanging private fragmented plots; and to explain the different contract 
choices between landlords  and buyers/renters. These objectives can be achieved by 
comparative analysis of land transactions at the land market in two regions with different 
levels of land fragmentation.  
2.  LAND FRAGMENTATION AS A PHENOMENON 
Bulgarian agricultural sector has gone through many radical changes after the collapse 
of communism. Such a stress in the sector was the de-collectivization process, frequently 
changed land law and restitution of land to the original landlords. The purpose of these 
changes was to establish conditions for a market-oriented and competitive agricultural sector, 
but the transition process created great uncertainly. The reform was carried out through the 
Law for Ownership and Use of Agricultural Land (LOUAL), which was amended many 
times.  
The land reform in Bulgaria started with liquidation of the old type of cooperatives, 
which were main regulator of the economic and social life in the villages (figure 1). Then, it 
was privatization of the agricultural assets and distribution of these assets to the landlords. 
The new farm structure, which emerged after the reform, comprised of large firm enterprises, 
new cooperatives and small subsistence farmers. They tried to adjust to the new agricultural 
conditions in the country. Parallel to this process, restitution of agricultural farmland was 
carried out. Most of the land, before collectivization, was cultivated by small family farmers - 
and the farmland has been restituted to the landlords prior to 1948.  It is important to point out 
that the farmland in Bulgaria was never nationalized. Therefore, from a legal point of view 
this land reform was an act of restitution (Swinnen 1997). Most of the individuals, who have 
obtained their land property, were too old to farm. Therefore, some of them preferred to 
transfer their land rights to their heirs. However, the heirs also have no working association 
with the land. Consequently, this has contributed to the current situation of fragmented plots 
of land.  
Landownership has very important political motivations and it was not so simple to 
complete quickly this process (Swinnen 1997). The changes in the political power and 
   2respectively the LOUAL and also political debate about this issues influence the whole 
agricultural policy of the country. The reform create over 2 million landlords with many plots, 
where each owning on average 3.8 plots with size of 0.53 hectares ((Kopeva 2002)). The high 
uncertainty in agriculture put all agricultural producers in an unfavorable situation and 
difficulties to plan their future farm activities. In addition, the restitution process has led to a 
decrease in the yields of over 50% for the main agricultural crops because, the level of 
fertilizer and pesticide applied to the land. The result of the reform is land fragmentation, land 
abandonment and low land productivity. 
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Now, it is important to define, land fragmentation: whether or not it is a problem; for 
whom; and why. Who suffers from land fragmentation and what kind of institutional options 
can fit to the problem? And, further how can we study the behavior of individuals in the 
process of exchanging their rights on land. The ability to exchange land rights affects the 
efficiency of the land market. 
According to several authors (Binns 1950, Swinnen 2000, Cheng 2001, Dijk 2002, 
Kopeva and Noev 2002, etc), land fragmentation is a common phenomenon in the less 
developed agricultural systems and can impact agricultural development. According to (Dijk 
2002), land fragmentation is an effect of transformation from one system into another, i.e. 
from central–planning economy into a market economy or breaking the collective structures 
into private farms or new type of cooperatives. He argues that the privatization of the 
collective assets combined with land restitution lead to this phenomenon. He distinguishes 
between two types of land fragmentation: land fragmentation in terms of ownership and land 
fragmentation in terms of land use. The land fragmentation can be more problematic in terms 
of ownership then in terms of use since the agricultural producers can rent several plots and 
operate them as one farm unit. All these producers might play a consolidation role in this 
process.  
(Cheng and Wan 2001) quoted from Binns (1950) that land fragmentation can be 
defined as spatial dispersions of fields into separate and distant parcels. He also gives a clear 
definition of land fragmentation i.e. fragmentation exists when a household operates more 
then one separate plot of land. Land fragmentation may arise involuntarily, and it maybe a 
result of land scarcity and inheritance. Furthermore, he describes the land fragmentation in 
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implementation of the current family farming or production structure. While elsewhere land 
fragmentation occurs mainly as a result of inheritance customs when farmland is more or less 
equally divided among heirs.   
Going back to the Bulgarian case, land fragmentation is a traditional problem for the country. 
The problem existed before the collectivization process between 1897 and 1947 but has 
worsened after restitution process in 1991 (Table 1). According to study unertaken (Kopeva, 
Noev et al. 2002), the reform “end up with more than 2.6 million private farmland titles with 
average holdings of two hectares” and after subdividing the plots among 2-6 heirs, the plots 
number may rise to over 12 million with an average size of 0.3-0.5 hectares. The LOUAL and 
the liberal Inheritance Law, which provide equal share rights to heirs, are the main driving 
forces behind the current process of land fragmentation in terms of ownership. Taking in mind 
that the land has different quality and is subdivided in different soil categories, there is a 
physical split of each plot into a number of plots corresponding to the number of heirs. This is 
in contrast to the allocation of whole plots to one heir. The heirs obtain land with equal share 
of land and subdivide between them the land with different soil quality and size. In this 
situation, land users have more disadvantages than the owners, because of high transaction 
and financial costs with fragmented plots and uncertainty in agricultural sector.  
TABLE 1 Land fragmentation process in Bulgaria (1897 - 2001) 
Indicators    1897 1908 1934 1946 2001 
Agricultural land  ha  3 977 557  4 625 787  4 368 429  4 317 696  4 182 000 
Farms number 546 084  640 511  884 869  1 103 900  1 777 200 
Plots number 7 980 000  9 880 000  11862 158  12200 000  8 007 000 
Average farm size  ha  7,30 6,30 4,90 3,90 2,40 
Number of plots   number 9,98  10,58 13,40 11,00  4,50 
Average plot size  ha  0,49 0,47 0,37 0,35 0,52 
Source: Statistical offices of Bulgaria (1908-2001) 
    
In conclusion, land fragmentation in a country can be a barrier for sustainable 
development of agriculture, farm efficiency and land use and also land transactions can be 
more complicated and more expensive.  The land fragmentation in ownership can be defined 
by average plot size, number of plots and total quantity of the owned land. This type of 
fragmentation can contribute to economic development and contractual choice between the 
landlords and land users. On the other side, land fragmentation in term of use can be defined 
by number of cultivated plots and number of agricultural producers.  
3.  THEORETICAL APPROACH 
In the world of costly transactions, a market without any cooperation between 
individuals is impossible.  This cooperation can be under different arrangements. The task of 
individuals with bounded rational behavior in the real world with positive transaction costs is 
to find suitable partners for exchange of their rights. The suitable place is a market. The 
neoclassical economic view of the market considers only the price mechanism under zero 
transaction cost. The New Institutional Economics (NIE) can be useful with its understanding 
of market organization. The market as an organization has the purpose to organize exchange 
efficiently, in other words, to facilitate market transactions (Furubotn and Richter 1997).   
Several theories of the NIE can be useful for the analysis of land fragmentation in Bulgaria: 
the transaction costs theory, theory of property rights and theory of agricultural contracting.   
2.1 The concept of transaction costs theory    
Transaction cost economics concentrates on the exchange process between economic 
agents. While conducting transactions, the agents endure not only financial cost, but also 
transaction cost. Depending on the contract forms and contracting agents, there are different 
level and types of transaction costs. The main types are the cost of searching, information 
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costs can also be defined as ex ante (i.e. drafting, negotiation) and ex post (after the contracts 
are signed i.e. safeguarding the agreement). Hence, the ex ante costs are the cost associated 
with the bargaining actions and ex post costs are the cost for maintaining the contracts. It is 
impossible to do all bargaining action in ex ante contracting stage. The reasons for this are the 
bounded rationality and opportunistic behavior of the individuals combined with the attributes 
of transactions (i.e. assets specificity).  The bargaining action depends on the behavior 
assumptions. There are two behavior assumptions bounded rationality, where the behavior is 
rational but limited by the person knowledge (Simon, 1961) and opportunistic, which is 
condition for ‘self-interests seeking with guile’(Williamson 1996).  When bounded rationality, 
opportunism and assets specificity are included then the world of governance becomes 
important. The transactions should be organized in such a way that the influence of the above 
three factors can be minimized (Williamson 1985). Therefore, the transactions need to be 
identified and then the incentive and adaptive means of alternative governance structures need 
to be used to economize transaction costs. 
The transaction costs approach can explain the contract choice. Each contract type has 
different transaction costs. The information costs can hinder certain transaction among 
landlords and land users and also can create incentive for opportunistic behaviour and mistrust 
between them. Also, the negotiation costs are high when land is fragmented in term of 
ownership. The land tenants and land buyers can have problems to find and negotiate with all 
landowners and especially with absentee landlords. Most of landlords live in different places 
and this creates problems for the land users to go through the negotiating process with all of 
the landlords. On the other side, the landlords have problems to provide accurate information 
about their plots. The opportunity costs, which the landlords and land users face, in term of 
money costs and time costs may actually prevent the transactions. 
The mechanism for governing the high transaction costs for exchanging land plots 
among the landlords and land users includes market and hierarchy forms and many other 
intermediaries.  The market refers to land market or when a transaction can be accomplished 
by selling or buying land or rent in or rent out land. The hierarchy is a government agency 
who will be involved in transaction process, by providing information about the land, land 
conversion, controlling the use of the land, environmental protection of the land, or 
participating in the land market.  
2.2 The concept of property rights theory  
The land resource has major impact on economic development in the agrarian 
societies because land provides livelihood to many poor and rural households (Swinnen 
1999). Also possession of land is a way to accumulate wealth and allows for a transfer of this 
wealth between generations. The opportunities to exchange land rights affects the efficiency 
of the land market.  The property rights literature suggests that private property rights are 
necessary and provides possibility for investments in the land and also reduces the risk to 
income and consumption. The changes of the land institutions affect the redistribution of 
wealth and rents and often the economic and political power. 
The property rights approach is used to illustrate the allocation of resources. The 
property rights of a physical asset give the landlords opportunity to use this asset, to extract 
income and to have power over its management. The ownership gives individuals 
discretionary power over the resource and provides a basis for a competitive market. When 
there are conditions of full private ownership, the holder of property rights has the choice of 
utilizing the asset himself, leasing the asset, or selling it to someone else. In case of a sale the 
holder, transfers the ‘bundle” of property rights to another person. However, when there is 
action of government or others, the property rights on an asset is changed and also the value of 
the asset is changes as well (Furubotn and Richter 1997) Therefore, the ownership over the 
scarce resources and the bundle of rights attributed to the ownership influence the economic 
outcome. The privately owned resources will be transferred from one owner to other by a 
bidding process and hence to the highest-valued use (Pejovich 1972).  
 
   52.3 The concept of agricultural contracting theory  
The theory of agricultural contracting tries to explain the different contract choices 
between agents (owner of the land) and principals (user of the land), endowed with different 
human capital, in the same institutional and technological environment (Hayami and Otsuka 
1993). The analysis of the contracts is based on the principal-agent model
2. The optimum 
contract seeks a balance between providing work-incentives for the landlord and the land 
user’s exposure to risk (1993: 176). In agriculture, different factors such as the weather 
conditions, pests etc have strong influence on production and this complicates the contract 
choice. The transaction costs are higher for choosing the right contract between the both 
partners. Uncertainly for making decision could be reduced by providing access to the right 
information.  
A land transaction occurs when the landlord, who has a bundle of rights
3 to the land, 
exchanges their land or certain rights to use the land, to a land user/tenant. When the 
transaction is a ‘sale’, the transfer of private property rights are defined by government 
regulations and laws governing how property rights are to be transferred within the sale 
contract. The landlord has to transfer fully his bundle of property rights to the new individual 
under the sale contract. However, when the property rights from one landlord are not fully 
transferred, but only partially to another individual, in that case, the transaction of the land 
between both parties can be described under as a tenancy contract. A tenancy contract 
establishes a transfer of money in exchange for rights to use the land. The rental contract 
specifies the rules to which both parties must adhere. For example, it can be specified whether 
land can be transferred to a third party, what happens if there is abuse to the land, whether 
yield will be shared between both parties, how decisions are made to cultivate the land etc. 
Within the literature on land transactions, it is the issue of agricultural land tenancy which is 
most frequently explored. The contracts relating to the sale of land is largely neglected, due to 
the complexity of institutions surrounding it. 
The main difficulty in the agricultural tenancy contract literature is to define the 
correct contract form. The combination of the three components: land, landlord and labour 
need to be specified appropriately within the contract. There are three main types of contracts 
under agricultural tenancy contract: fixed wage contracts; crop-share tenancy and fixed rent 
contracts.  In the fixed wage contract, the labourers are employed to work for a fixed time 
period and under supervision of the farmer. The supervision is costly, where is difficult for the 
supervisors to monitor all activity (Williamson 1985). The crop-share tenancy contract occurs 
when the landlord lets a tenant work the land, while the output is shared between the two 
parties. Under this type of contract both parties can gain by organizing their transactions in the 
best way to lower transaction costs. Finally, the rental contact is established when the tenants, 
who collaborate with landlords by renting their land, pay a fixed amount for its use over a 
discrete time period (Barzel 1989). 
4.  METHODOLOGY 
To understand how the phenomenon land fragmentation impacts on the land market 
development, I will use comparative design, which is most efficient and corresponding with 
the research problem. This method is a comparison of two contrasting cases. Also, the 
comparative analysis gives possibility to understand the social problem of different 
prospective views. Therefore, by competitive situation, it will enable the establishment of 
relations among the cases and link them to the theory.  
In the research, I used quantitative statistical data regarding landownership to select 
the regions in the national level with low and high level of land fragmentation. The data is 
obtained from the interviews with agricultural offices “Agriculture and Forest” in these two 
regions. 
The interviews were conducted with representatives from agricultural offices 
“Agriculture and Forest” and village mayors.    The questions that I posted were related to the 
their activities and functions, historical information about the land reform in the investigated 
regions, information about the landownership data, land market, land fragmentation and its 
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of reform and land fragmentation and to understand how land sales and rental markets work 
within regions with different levels of land fragmentation. The interview was conducted with 
open-ended questions.  
Using landownership data two regions were selected. In order to facilitate the choice I 
set up a few constraints. These constraints are: background history of regions, different 
location of these regions in Bulgaria and possibility to find similar crop pattern.  
 
FIGURE 2 Landownership data in Bulgaria: average plot size, ha  
Average Plot Size per Region in Bulgaria, ha
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Source: (MAF, 2004)  
According to figure 2, the region with low level of land fragmentation is Dobrich with 
average plot size 2.03 ha. This region is located in North-West of Bulgaria. With high level of 
land fragmentation, the chosen region is Plovdiv region - average plot size 0.53 ha. The region 
is located in Central-South of Bulgaria. In the region, high-value crops such as vegetables and 
fruits, are grown with low level of land fragmentation while in the region with high level of 
land fragmentation low-value crops dominate. The main crops grown in the Dobrich region 
are the cereals, which accounts to 90% of the cultivated land. In Plovdiv region main crops are 
vegetables and perennial plants, while the share of the cereal crops is about 42% of the 
cultivated land.
5.  OUTCOMES OF THE CONDUCTED RESEACH 
In this part, I will analyze both regions with high and low level of land fragmentation 
and compare the land market in these regions.  
 
5.1 Overview of Dobrich region with low level of land fragmentation 
The land reform in the Dobrich region was completed earlier (1995) compared with 
the Plovdiv region, Bulgaria. The cooperatives were liquidated and the land was restituted to 
their original owners. After the reform, the land market was not well developed. Dobrich 
region is an extreme case and the land is not so fragmented, compared with rest of the 
country. There are several reasons for this: first, the owners had more land before the 
collectivization process in 1956; Second, the homogeneity of the soil quality provided an 
opportunity to consolidate the plots which belong to one owner in one location without major 
conflicts; And third, the existence of large areas of state owned land gave the chance of the 
owners (or and users) to exchange their land with state consolidated land.  
The main crops grown in Dobrich region are low-value crops such as wheat, maize 
and sunflower. The soil is fertile but not irrigated. The quality of the farmland is similar in the 
region. The total agricultural land is about 376770 ha and non-cultivated land is 797 ha (NSI 
2003) 
   7The land restitution process in the region faced several problems.  Many of the 
original documents were missing.  Since, it was allowed the landlords to use different type of 
documents some of them took advantages of this situation. They claimed the same land two or 
three times. Hence, the Land Commissions (LC) was forced to give back land from the State 
Land Fund. This problem was also reinforced by the many amendments of the LOUAL and 
lack of clear evidence for landownership.  
During the restitution process, there were conflicts between landlords and also 
between landlords and the LC members. The conflict among the landlords was based on the 
land identification while the conflict between landlords and the LC was related to location or 
quantity of restituted land. At this time, the LC had decision power and they controlled the 
whole restitution process.   
The leaseholders, cooperatives and mayors are among the main designers of the farm 
models in the region. The typical model in the region for solving the land fragmentation in 
ownership is to divide the land of villages between all producers each year. This informal 
process is widespread and practiced for a long time. Since the quality of land is uniform in the 
region this practice seems to be successful. This process is known as informal land 
consolidation in practice.   
 
5.2 Overview of Plovdiv region with high level of land fragmentation     
     The restitution process in the Plovdiv region was completed between 1998 and 2000. 
Two different approaches of land restitution were used: restitution farmland in old (before 
collectivization) real boundaries and restitution land in new real boundaries. They were 
determined by soil quality and crop structure. The first approach was mainly applied in areas 
with heterogeneous soil and crop structure while in the opposite case the land was restituted in 
new boundaries.   
     The main documents, which were used, are available deeds, information from the tax 
register before collectivization and entry register for cooperatives.  These documents are 
demanded to prove land ownership, the size and location of the plots. If the documents were 
not available, the claimed property can also be proved by witnesses. These witnesses were old 
people in the settlement. Although, the process of land restitution is over in the region there 
are still many landlords, who had not claimed their land. The LOUAL allows them to do so 
within ten years, through the court system. 
     The reasons for comparatively high level of land fragmentation in the Plovdiv case 
are: most of the land is restituted in old real boundaries;  no subdivided property rights 
between heirs; many absentee landowners; the instability of the agricultural product price 
(price of vegetables); low land price, according to landlords but high according to land users.  
     The soil in the Plovdiv region is fertile and irrigated. The relief is flat in the centre and 
hilly in north and south ends. The main crops grown in the region are high-value crops: 
vegetables and fruits. The cultivated agricultural land is 346980 ha and non-cultivated land  is 
12904 ha (NSI 2003).  
     The main designers of the farm structure in the region are small subsistence farmers 
and a few large producers. There is no typical informal mechanism for solving the problem 
with land fragmentation in the region, but there are some cases, similar to the Dobrich region, 
where the producers of low-value crops, have exchanged their land plots and have reached 
some level in consolidation in land use.  
5.3 Comparative analyses of land sales and rental market in both regions  
The land market in both regions does not function properly. The main constraints for 
the land market in both regions is unclear property rights, low value of farmland, landlords’ 
sentimental value to their family land and the expectation of increasing the price after the EU 
accession (speculation). The main land transactions are between relatives and friends, when 
the heirs subdivided and exchange the farmland between them and at the rental market.   
Therefore, it makes the situation for land users complicated. The subdivision of land among 
the inheritors will further deepen land fragmentation in ownership and constrain future land 
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find the appropriate mechanism to solve the problem with land fragmentation in ownership. 
The observed process of exchanging land plots between land users, in both cases shows that 
the local actors are searching and may have found a way to manage the exchange of land.  
The similarity in both regions is that all land transactions are concentrated at the 
rental land market. In the region with low level of land fragmentation, where the crop 
structure is mainly low-value crops, the size of cultivated plots should be over 3 ha, otherwise, 
the production costs would be not justified. The opposite case is the region with high level of 
land fragmentation and high-value crop structure. The small size of the plots does not seem to 
be a huge problem. The local landlords and/or small farmers mainly cultivate their backyards 
or plots close to villages. The large land users cultivate the fields further from the village.  
In both regions, most of the landlords have informal arrangements with land users 
(oral contracts). However, in order to claim subsidies from the state, the land users sign formal 
contracts for a part of the land they cultivate. The rest of the land is used with informal 
contractual arrangements between both parties. The land users prefer to be under these 
informal arrangements with landlords because of high transaction costs and opportunity costs.  
Furthermore, the procedure of formalizing contractual arrangements between landlords and 
land users is complicated and expensive.  
The State does not have a clear policy on how to handle the process with subdivision 
between the heirs and to facilitate contractual process. Still, there are many heirs with unclear 
property rights because the legislation process for obtaining title is costly and most of them 
are living far away from their land.  
In Dobrich region, there are large leaseholders, who cultivate over 3000 ha. They play 
a significant role on the land market. In case, a landlord does not sign a contract and rent out 
his land to one of the leaseholders and/or decides to cultivate alone, he has two options: to get 
instead of his land a plot located at the end of the big tract or to negotiate for rent, and to 
obtain nothing from influential user. The large leaseholders are strong and they have own 
machinery and access to information. Using their relations they can obtain information such as 
landlord names, size of plots, location, and quality.  Most of landlords are banded with long 
term contracts with leaseholders. The formal contracts are signed for long term period 
between 5 to10 years.  The rent is in kind with 30-35 % of production or in cash 50-75 
EUR/ha. The local landlords received both type of rent, while the landlords who live in the 
cities received the rent in cash in their bank accounts. The rent is the same for all landlords, 
because large farmers work together and negotiate with each other and offer the same rent to 
all landlords. During the last years the competition between the leaseholders has increased.  
In Plovdiv region, the agricultural producers have only few contracts for long-term 
period and most are for short-term period. Most of the contracts are informal. The main 
problems for formalization of land transaction on the rental land market are the large number 
of landlords/heirs; non-subdivided formally ownership rights between heirs and difficulties to 
find all landlords and to contract with them. It creates a problem for both, landlords and land 
users. The land users have problems to sign formal contracts and to obtain the state subsidies. 
On the other side, landlords often do not receive the rent for their land. In the region, the share 
of rented land is 4.95% and number of land transactions is over 20 000 with 149 land users. 
The rent is mainly in kind with 12-20 % of production.  
     By compassing both regions, which are almost the same size in terms of cultivated 
land, the frequencies (numbers) of land transactions within region with high level of land 
fragmentation is relatively higher than region with low level of land fragmentation. The land 
rental transactions in both regions are mainly informal for short-time period while the long-
term contracts are formal. The rent can be “in kind”, in cash or both. Most of the large 
leaseholders and cooperatives use the support and services of the local agricultural offices and 
administrative offices (mayor) for their land transactions (sales and rentals), while the small 
subsistence farms rely on relatives, friends, and lawyers (in the case of buying/selling land). 
Land transactions have increased through the time. 
The situation in the selling of land is comparatively different between both regions. In 
Dobrich region, the leaseholders wants to buy land, but there аrе not many land transactions. 
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the land price to increase after the EU accession. Now, average land price is 670 EUR/ha. The 
land market in the Plovdiv region is also weak. The land price is higher compared with 
Dobrich. The land market differs substantially among the municipalities of the region. The 
average land price varies between 1500 – 1700 EUR/ha in the region for the last year.   
Important factors for the land price are the quality of the land, access to irrigation systems and 
location of the plots. The preferred location is near to populated places or routes but this land 
is purchased for non agricultural use.  
Land abandonment is an important issue for the State. In the country, abandoned land 
is around 16 %. The region with low level of land fragmentation nearly all of the land is 
cultivated while in the region with high level of land fragmentation, the abandoned land is 
over 4-5 %.  The reasons for this are no defined property rights between landlords/inheritors; 
lack of credits to small producers; lack of machinery and lack of possibility to buy agricultural 
machinery;  thefts of agricultural production;  low price of agricultural production, many 
fragmented plots and lack of trust between unknown outsider land users.  
Five years after the land restitution process was completed, the land users are still 
searching but may have found a way to consolidate fragmented plots and to manage with 
unclear property rights. The comparison between the regions with high and low level of land 
fragmentation show that Dobrich region had already found mechanisms for solving the 
problem with land fragmentation in ownership by dividing the land between land users while 
in Plovdiv region this process just started. The established informal rule of land use can be 
useful practice for land consolidation.  
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
The land fragmentation has an impact on market development. The level of land 
fragmentation cannot be easily defined. In these two cases, the farmland plot size can be only 
a relative number. There are some additional factors such as quality of the land and crop 
structure, which can be important for explaining the different levels of land fragmentation. 
The number of farmland plots is a factor, which refer to exchange process and transaction 
costs and also restrict the future activities of the agricultural producers. Therefore, the land 
fragmentation can be a function of all those factors such as average farmland size, number of 
farmland plots, quality of farmland, and crop structure.  
Land fragmentation is a problem for the farming system and contractual choice of 
each farm. The main types of contracts for both regions are share and cash rent contracts. 
Share contract is preferred mainly by landlords who live in the rural area, while the absentee 
landlords prefer cash rent contacts with out the risk for getting less or nothing from their 
property.  Most of the contracts are informal and oral because of unclear property rights and 
high transactions cost to formalize them. In practice, the land is managed or even cultivated 
by a member of the family who lives in the rural area close to the property. However, in most 
cases they own only part of the family land. For the agricultural producers situation is 
unfavorable to contract in formal and written formal because they have to negotiate not only 
with owners who live in the village but with many owners who often live out of the villages.  
The restitution process and land market development in both regions are similar but 
there is some difference. First, the region with high level of land fragmentation, the land 
market is less developed compared with the other region. Second, both regions have different 
crop structures, with low and high-value crops, which require different plot size   
Therefore, when we think about the effects and future development of land 
fragmentation in term of ownership we need to take into consideration the transaction cost and 
the state of land market.  While, when we try to evaluate the negative impact of fragmentation 
in land use we need to consider the crop structure and established and future development of 
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NOTES:  
 
  1.  Violeta Dirimanova is a PhD student, Chair of Resource Economics, Humboldt University Berlin, 
Germany. The paper presented at EAAE Seminar on Institutional Units in Agriculture, held in Wye, 
UK, April 9-10, 2005 
 
 2.  The agency theory is concerned with designing an optimum contract between a principal and an 
agent. The problems here are: (1) the principal can not observe directly the agent’s action and (2) the 
outcome is influenced not only by the agent’s action but also by uncertain factors outside his control. 
Therefore, uncertainty and risk characterize the transaction exchange between both actors. 
 3.  The bundle of property rights are those rights which give to the landowner rights to use, to sell, to 
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